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I. INTRODUCTION

Banking and financial regulation—which I’ll hereafter refer to simply as financial
regulation—is needed because the financial system provides functions that are essential
to economic development. The principal function is the aggregation of moneys and the
allocation thereof for productive projects. Although each nation regulates banking and
finance in its own ways, the universal nature of finance drives a natural convergence in
the nature of financial regulation. This chapter thus focuses on the universal principles of
financial regulation.

A. Banking

Traditionally, financial regulation focused on banking because banks historically
have been the primary entities that have aggregated moneys—primarily by taking
deposits from customers—and then allocated such monies—primarily by making loans—
to borrowers to invest in productive projects, such as factories. Traditional financial
regulation therefore is geared to ensuring that deposit-taking banks can continue to
perform these functions efficiently.

B. Shadow Banking

In recent years, non-banks have increasingly begun replacing
(“disintermediating”) traditional banks as the intermediaries of funds—that is, the entities
that aggregate moneys and then allocate such monies to firms to invest in productive
projects. Shadow banking is a loose term that refers to this process of disintermediation. 2
The size of the shadow-banking sector—which includes securitization, money-market
mutual funds, hedge funds, securities lending, asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”)
2
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conduits, structured investment vehicles (“SIVs”), and repo financing—was estimated at
$60 trillion worldwide in December 2011. 3 More recent estimates suggest an even higher
number. 4

Several reasons, including efficiency and regulatory arbitrage, account for the
rapid rise of shadow banking. Shadow banking can be efficient because disintermediation
removes traditional banks as the “middleman” of funding, thereby avoiding the profit
mark-up that banks charge on their loans. Furthermore, in markets where traditional
banks cannot flexibly operate due to overly restrictive regulation, shadow banks can help
to fund unmet demands. 5 The response to Regulation Q in the United States is but one
example of this. Regulation Q imposed limits on the interest rates that banks could pay to
depositors, creating an unmet demand—especially by institutional depositors—for higher
returns. That demand sparked the rise of money-market mutual funds, which offered
much higher rates of return than bank deposits. 6

3

Philipp Halstrick, Tighter Bank Rules Give Fillip to Shadow Banks, REUTERS (Dec. 20,
2011, 4:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/20/ uk-regulation-shadowbanking-idUSLNE7BJ00T20111220 (last visited June 10, 2013).
4
See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT (2012),
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121118c.pdf (estimating shadow
banking’s worldwide assets as $67 trillion in 2011). Cf. Sheridan Prasso, Shadow
Banking, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/shadowbanking/ (reporting that the Financial Stability Board believes that shadow banking grew
by $5 trillion in 2012 to $71 trillion).
5
Timothy Lane, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Canada, “Shedding Light on Shadow
Banking,” Speech to the CFA Society (June 26, 2013), available at
http://www.bis.org/review/r130628g.pdf.
6
Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, 138
(2011). Sometimes, however, shadow banking can result from pure regulatory arbitrage,
without efficiency considerations. For example, in the context of mortgage lending, bank
holding companies (BHCs) can lend through affiliated depository institutions (ADIs) or
affiliated mortgage companies (AMCs). Whereas ADIs are chartered and subject to
banking regulations, including capital requirements, underwriting requirements, and strict
accounting practices, AMCs are not subject to any such regulation. Yuliya Demyanyk &
Elena Loutskina, Mortgage Companies and Regulatory Arbitrage 2 (Fed. Res. Bank of
Cleveland, Working Paper No. 12-20R 2014), available at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/2012/wp1220r.pdf. By using an AMC
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Regardless of the reasons for the rise of shadow banking, the failure of financial
regulation to adequately address that rise “is widely believed to have contributed to the
buildup of risks in the financial system in the period leading up to” the 2008 global
financial crisis (the “financial crisis”). 7 Financial regulation must also focus on shadow
banking.

C. Some Fundamentals

Actual financial regulation tends to be imperfect. Policymakers and regulators
tend to respond to the media, which can create distortions by emphasizing what
journalists find accessible. Furthermore, after a financial crisis, people naturally want to
prevent the next crisis. Regulators, who are themselves usually subject to political shorttermism, typically respond by focusing on preventative regulation, or at least regulation
aimed at preventing the next financial meltdown. But that focus is insufficient because it
is impossible to always predict the cause of the next financial crisis.

Moreover, financial regulation is often tethered to the financial architecture—the
particular design and structure of financial firms, markets, and other related institutions—
at the time the regulation is promulgated. Ongoing monitoring and updating of that
regulation can be costly, however, and is subject to political interference at each updating
stage.

instead of an ADI, BHCs can avoid regulation and can engage in riskier lending
practices. Id.
7
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 75, 85 (2013). See also Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Speech at the Russell Sage Foundation and The Century
Foundation Conference on Rethinking Finance (April 13, 2012), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm (arguing that
mortgage lending through AMCs, discussed supra note 6, encouraged risky lending
practices that contributed to the financial crisis).
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Notwithstanding these distortions, financial regulation gets enacted. In discussing
such regulation, it is useful to distinguish what economists sometimes call
microprudential and macroprudential regulation. Financial regulation of the components
of the financial system—fundamentally firms and markets—to ensure that they can
efficiently perform their underlying economic functions is called microprudential
regulation. Financial regulation of the financial system’s ability to function as a network
within which its components can operate is called macroprudential regulation, and thus
the goal of macroprudential regulation is to prevent “systemic” risk. As will be discussed,
there is some overlap in these terms.

II. MICROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION

As mentioned, microprudential regulation focuses on ensuring that firms and
markets, the components of the financial system, can efficiently perform their underlying
economic functions. In general, firms and markets operate efficiently absent “market”
failures; hence the goal of microprudential financial regulation is to correct market
failures.

A. Correcting Market Failures

1. Information Failure. A key market failure is information failure, which can
undermine the reliability of pricing. Funding depends on reliable pricing. Regulation
could therefore improve funding by correcting this market failure.

The principal information failure is information asymmetry, referring to parties to
a transaction having different amounts of relevant information. For example, an issuer of
financial securities usually has more (and better) information than investors in the
securities about the risks.

Increasing financial complexity is exacerbating this failure, by undermining
disclosure, which since the securities laws of the 1930s has been the chief regulatory tool
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to reduce information asymmetry. Securities laws generally rely on disclosure, but some
financial structures are getting so complex that they are effectively incomprehensible. It
may even be rational sometimes for an investor to invest in high-yield complex securities
without fully understanding them. There may be many reasons for this. For example, the
investor simply may not have the staffing to evaluate the securities, whereas failure in
invest would appear to—and in fact could—competitively prejudice the investor vis-à-vis
others who invest. 8 Thus, many institutional investors—including even the largest, most
sophisticated, firms—bought complex mortgage-backed securities prior to the financial
crisis without fully understanding them. 9

Financial complexity is inevitable. Profit opportunities are inherent in complexity,
due in part to investor demand for securities that more precisely match their risk and
reward preferences. Regulatory arbitrage increases complexity as market participants take
advantage of inconsistent regulatory regimes both within and across national borders.
And new technologies continue to add complexity not only to financial products but also
to financial markets. Complexity may well be the greatest future challenge for financial
regulation.

2. Rationality Failure. Another market failure is rationality failure, which can also
undermine the reliability of pricing. Even in financial markets, humans have bounded
rationality. In areas of complexity, for example, we tend to overrely on heuristics—
broadly defined as simplifications of reality that allow us to make decisions in spite of
our limited ability to process information. Modern finance has become so complex that
the financial community routinely relies on heuristic-based customs, such as determining
creditworthiness of securities by relying on formalistic credit ratings and assessing risk
on financial products by relying on simplified mathematical models. Market participants
also follow the herd in their investment choices and are prone to panic. Furthermore, they
are unrealistically optimistic when thinking about extreme events with which they have

8

See Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2008
UTAH LAW REVIEW 1109, 1113-15 (2008).
9
Id. at 1110.
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no recent experience, devaluing the likelihood and potential consequences of those
events. Because human nature cannot be easily changed, there are limited regulatory
solutions to the problem of rationality failure.

3. Agency Failure. This market failure generally refers to the misalignment of the
interests of principals and their agents. Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting
from conflicts of interest between managers and owners of firms. There also is a much
more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of secondary-management
conflicts. The nub of the problem is that secondary managers are almost always paid
under short-term compensation schemes, misaligning their interests with the long-term
interests of the firm. Complexity exacerbates this problem by increasing information
asymmetry between technically sophisticated secondary managers and the senior
managers to whom they report.

For example, with limited technical expertise and limited time available to devote
to risk assessment, a firm’s senior managers often want risk to be modeled and reduced to
useable numbers. 10 Models, however, can be manipulated. For example, VaR, or valueat-risk, has been the most widely used model for reducing investment risk to a number. 11
As the VaR model became more accepted, banks began compensating analysts not only
for generating profits but also for generating profits with low risks, measured by VaR.
Analysts therefore began to refocus investment portfolios to concentrate more on
securities (such as mortgage-backed securities and credit-defaults swaps) that generate
gains but only rarely have losses. 12 Because the likelihood of these losses was less than

10

Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
Id. at 26.
12
Id. In a credit-default swap, one party (the credit “seller”) agrees, in exchange for the
payment to it of a fee by a second party (the credit “buyer”), to assume the credit risk of
certain debt obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. If a “credit event” (for
example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of that obligor, the credit seller will
either (a) pay the credit buyer an amount calculated by reference to post-default value of
the debt obligations or (b) buy the debt obligations (or other eligible debt obligations of
the obligor) for their full face value from the credit buyer. See Steven L. Schwarcz,
11
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the risk percentages taken into account under VaR modeling—which typically excludes
losses that have less than a one-percent (or, in some cases, five-percent) likelihood of
occurring within the model’s limited time frame—such losses were not included in the
VaR computations. 13 Analysts knew but did not always make clear to senior management
that in the rare cases where such losses occurred, they would be huge. 14

In theory, firms can solve this principal-agent failure by paying managers,
including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation schemes—e.g.,
compensation subject to clawbacks or deferred compensation based on long-term results.
In practice, however, that solution would confront a collective action problem: firms that
offer their secondary managers longer-term compensation might not be able to hire as
competitively as firms that offer more immediate compensation.

Regulation can solve the collective action problem, and thus correct the principalagent failure, by requiring financial firms—or at least those that meet relevant criteria of
materiality—to pay managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term
compensation schemes. However, because good secondary managers can work in
financial centers worldwide, international regulation may be needed to help fully solve
the collective action problem.

4. Risk Marginalization. Risk dispersion is intended to reduce risk from the
standpoint of any given investor through investment diversification and more efficient
allocation of risk. But if risk is spread too widely, it can become marginalized such that
rational market participants individually lack the incentive to monitor it and important
correlations between risks can be obscured. 15 Furthermore, because the human brain’s

Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
211, 235 n. 131 (2009/2010).
13
Nocera, supra note 10, at 46.
14
Id.
15
Steven L. Schwarcz, Marginalizing Risk, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2012).
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ability to accurately correlate perceived and actual risk is limited, 16 we tend to ignore or
undervalue risk below a minimum threshold level. 17 For these and other reasons,
investors and other market participants sometimes underestimate and under-protect
against risk, with few worrying about where dispersed risk goes or whether risk
dispersion can impact the stability of financial markets. 18

Marginalization of risk can have both microprudential and macroprudential
consequences. The first—which is the subject of this Part II—occurs when the
marginalization harms only the market participants (and their investors) that
underestimate and under-protect against the risk. The second—which is the subject of
Part III below (discussing macroprudential regulation)—occurs when the marginalization
also harms the financial system itself, as happened in the financial crisis. 19

Macroprudential consequences are especially likely to occur when
marginalization of risk is coupled with collective action problems. For example, the
benefits of exploiting finite capital resources might accrue to individual market
participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resources, whereas the
costs of exploitation may be distributed more widely. 20 Absent regulatory intervention,
market participants will individually pursue their self-interests to the detriment of other
market participants (not to mention the financial system and the real economy). 21
Moreover, market participants—especially those who are investors—may act as free

16

See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Risk As Analysis and Risk As Feelings: Some Thoughts
About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311, 315 (2004).
17
See, e.g., Richard J. Herring et al., Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr. and Oliver Wyman Inst.
12th Annual Fin. Risk Roundtable 2009: The New Role of Risk Management: Rebuilding
the Model (June 24, 2009), available at
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2268. Cf. WILLIAM J.
RAPAPORT ET AL., LANGUAGE AND MEANING IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE: COGNITIVE ISSUES
AND SEMANTIC THEORY 85 (Josefa Toribio & Andy Clark eds., 1998) (observing the
human tendency to ignore details when overwhelmed by complexity).
18
Marginalizing Risk, supra note 15.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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riders, assuming that other investors have more significant amounts at stake and therefore
must be engaging in due diligence and monitoring. 22

Regulating risk dispersion that causes only microprudential consequences would
likely be inefficient because market participants themselves should want to protect
against those consequences. But regulating risk dispersion that causes macroprudential
consequences could well be appropriate, and indeed, parallels the traditional regulatory
focus of government. 23

B. Broader Regulatory Approaches.

The discussion so far has addressed how microprudential regulation can mitigate
market failures. Microprudential regulation can also address market failures more broadly
by ensuring that firms can resist the adverse impact of market failures.

1. Capital Requirements. The most common way that regulation accomplishes this
is by imposing “capital” requirements, which are intended to protect financial institutions
against unexpected losses. Capital requirements in their modern form—based on ratios

22

Id. Cf. GORDON DE BROUWER, HEDGE FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 150 (2001)
(noting that “even rational market participants may at times ignore their own private
information and follow the actions of earlier participants because the [perceived]
information in other people’s collective actions overwhelms the individual’s private
information.”). More crassly, an investor may rationalize that it will be in no worse
position than its competitors, who are making these same kinds of investments, if the
investment fails—especially given the investment’s relatively small size. Even if that
rationalization is justified at the outset, however, continuing competitive pressures may
motivate the investor to increase the investment, especially where approval of the initial
investment sets an institutional precedent that makes further approvals easier.
Marginalizing Risk, supra note 15.
23
For a discussion of how to design that regulation, see id. (arguing that although
regulatory responses may be second best, imperfect regulation may well be preferable to
limiting risk dispersion because the latter could inadvertently increase the potential for
regulatory arbitrage, increase financial instability, and impair the ability of parties to
achieve negotiated market efficiencies).
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rather than fixed dollar amounts—were introduced into banking regulation in the 1980s. 24
In that form, the requirements are expressed as capital-adequacy ratios: the minimum
ratio of equity (including equity-like securities) that a bank must hold as a percentage of
risk-weighted assets.

The imposition of capital requirements at the national level created a collective
action problem: banks subject to those requirements might become less competitive, at
least from a cost standpoint, than banks in nations that did not impose such requirements
(or that imposed less strict requirements). In response, bank regulators around the world
began to work together, through the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(hereinafter, “BCBS”), 25 to try to develop uniform capital requirements. 26

In 1988, the BCBS released the Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter, “Basel I”),
which set minimum capital-adequacy ratios for international banks in countries enacting
Basel I into law. Over 100 countries enacted Basel I or at least principles based on Basel
I. 27

Basel I took a two-tiered approach to defining “capital.” Tier 1 capital included
widely recognized forms of equity, such as shareholder’s equity and retained earnings.
Tier 2 included more controversial forms of equity, such as undisclosed reserves, assetrevaluation reserves, general loan-loss reserves, subordinated debt, and certain hybrid
24

Douglas J. Elliott, Greg Feldberg, & Andreas Lehnert, The History of Cyclical
Macroprudential Policy in the United States, Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics
Discussion Series No. 2013-29, at 34 (2013) (discussing how bank regulators switched
from using capital requirements based on fixed dollar amounts to capital requirements
based on the ratio of capital to total assets, and how the Basel I Accord spread that latter
regulatory approach internationally).
25
Established in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of Ten, the BCBS
“provides a forum for regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters” and its
objective is to “enhance understanding of key supervisory issues and improve the quality
of banking supervision worldwide.” The BCBS has no formal authority; it leaves the
implementation of recommendations to individual countries. See Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ (last visited July 22, 2014).
26
DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 29 & 45 (2008).
27
Id. at 64-65.
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(debt/equity) capital instruments. Basel I required internationally active banks to maintain
“total” capital—restricted to Tier 1 capital and a potentially discounted amount of Tier 2
capital 28—equal to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets. Assets—which in the case of
banks are primarily loans payable to the banks—were risk-weighted according to five
categories, depending on the generic type of the asset (and not, for example, the
particular creditworthiness the borrower on a loan). 29

Less than ten years after the release of Basel I, the BCBS began rethinking how to
improve capital-adequacy ratios. Basel I’s weaknesses included the bluntness of its riskweighting of assets and its exclusive focus on credit risk. 30 Experience also showed that
Basel I encouraged regulatory arbitrage, such as banks engaging in securitization
transactions instead of making loans. 31 The result was the release in 2004 of the Revised
Basel Capital Accord (hereinafter, “Basel II”).

Basel II retained some elements of Basel I, including the definition of capital and
the 8% requirement. However, it took a broader view of risk, including not only credit
risk (the risk that a borrower will not repay its loan) but also market risk (the risk that the
market value of an asset will decline) and operational risk (the “risk of loss resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events”). 32
Further, Basel II introduced a three-pillar regulatory structure, explained below, based on
(1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review, and (3) market discipline.

28

The amount of Tier 2 capital included in total capital could not exceed the amount of
Tier 1 capital.
29
TARULLO, supra note 26, at 57.
30
Market risk was included in Basel I, however, under the 1996 Market Risk
Amendment. Id. at 61.
31
Capital Standards for Banks: The Evolving Basel Accord, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 396 (Sept. 2003),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/0903lead.pdf.
32
Consultative Document Operational Risk, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT OPERATIONAL RISK 2 (2001), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf. The goal of incorporating operational risk into the
capital requirements was to reward banks with sophisticated risk management systems.
Id. at 1-2.
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The first pillar—minimum capital requirements—addressed credit, market, and
operational risk. Banks had to take all of these risks into account when calculating their
minimum capital requirement. Unlike Basel I, however, Basel II gave banks the option of
assessing credit risks through one of two internal ratings-based procedures or under a
standardized approach using external credit rating agencies. 33 The second pillar—
supervisory review—set forth guidelines for how banks should engage in risk assessment,
emphasizing monitoring, early intervention, and prompt remedial action to prevent the
capital-adequacy ratio from slipping below the 8% minimum. 34 The third pillar—market
discipline—focused on requiring banks to formally disclose their risks to the
marketplace, thereby providing other banks and market participants with information
needed to negotiate contract terms that, effectively, should reward healthy banks and
penalize risky banks. 35

Basel II was “available for implementation” at the end of 2007, but countries’
implementation timelines varied widely. The European Union fully implemented Basel II
within a year, whereas Botswana and Gambia planned on full implementation by 2015. 36
The financial crisis, however, soon highlighted the need for capital-adequacy ratios that
are less vulnerable to human error and bias. 37 The result is Basel III, 38 which has been

33

TARULLO, supra note 26, at 124-25. Banks could use three different methods to
calculate operational risk: the basic indicator approach, the standardized approach, and
the advanced/internal measurement approach. Market risk should be determined by the
value at risk approach.
34
GEOFFREY P. MILLER & FABRIZIO CAFAGGI, THE GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 175-76 (2013).
35
Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration, BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION 1, (July 2011), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs197.pdf.
36
TARULLO, supra note 26, at 126-27; Basel II, 2.5, and III Implementation, FINANCIAL
STABILITY INSTITUTE 4 & 8 (July 2012), http://www.bis.org/fsi/fsiop2012.pdf.
37
MILLER & CAFAGGI, supra note 34, at 180-81.
38
“Basel III” collectively refers to “Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more
resilient banks and banking systems,” “Basel III: International framework for liquidity
risk measurement, standards and monitoring,” and “Annex: Minimum requirements to
ensure loss absorbency at the point of non-viability.” See Basel III: A global regulatory
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, BASEL COMMITTEE ON
Oxford Handbook L&E.docx
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agreed to by members of the BCBS but is not slated for full implementation until January
2019. 39
Basel III reforms Basel II, 40 including by improving the inputs for banks’ internal
ratings-based (sometimes called “IRB”) risk-assessment approaches. Basel III also more
strictly defines what is included in Tier I capital 41 and sets a minimum capital-adequacy
requirement for Tier 1 capital itself (in addition to the minimum capital-adequacy
requirement for total capital). 42 Basel III also introduces greater disclosure requirements,
a liquidity requirement, a leverage requirement, and two buffers—a 2.5% capital
conservation buffer and a countercyclical capital buffer. The capital conservation buffer

BANKING SUPERVISION (Dec. 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf
[hereinafter, Basel III: A global regulatory framework]; Basel III: International
framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, BASEL COMMITTEE
ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Dec, 2010), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf; Annex:
Minimum requirements to ensure loss absorbency at the point of non-viability, BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (Jan. 2011),
http://www.bis.org/press/p110113.pdf.
39
The European Union and the United States enacted final sets of Basel III regulations in
June and July of 2013. According to an August 2013 BCBS report, “internationally active
banks continue to build capital, and appear well placed to meet the full set of fully
phased-in minimum Basel III capital requirements ahead of the 2019 deadline.” Report to
G20 Leaders on monitoring implementation of Basel III regulatory reforms, BASEL
COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION 1 (Aug. 2013),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs260.pdf.
40
Basel III modifies and builds on existing Basel capital accords, including Basel II.
International regulatory framework for banks (Basel III), BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm (last visited Aug. 3, 2014).
41
“The concept of Tier 1 that we are familiar with will continue to exist and will include
common equity and other instruments that have a loss-absorbing capacity on a “going
concern” basis, for example certain preference shares. Innovative capital instruments
which were permitted in limited amount as part of Tier 1 capital will no longer be
permitted and those currently in existence will be phased out.” Hervé Hannoun, Gen.
Manager, Bank for Int’l Settlements, The Basel III Capital Framework: a decisive
breakthrough, BoJ-BIS High Level Seminar on Financial Regulatory Reform:
Implications for Asia and the Pacific Hong Kong SAR (Nov. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp101125a.pdf.
42
The total capital minimum remains at 8%, but Basel III requires that “Common Equity
Tier 1 must be at least 4.5% of risk-weighted assets at all times” and that “Tier 1 Capital
must be at least 6.0% of risk-weighted assets at all times.” Basel III: A global regulatory
framework, supra note 38 at para. 49.
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is mandatory, intended to ensure that banks build up capital reserves that can be drawn
down in periods of stress to avoid breaches of the capital requirement minimum. 43 The
countercyclical capital buffer is discretionary, allowing national regulators to require
banks to maintain an additional 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth. 44

As traditional bank lending contracted during the financial crisis, shadow banking
expanded and filled part of the vacuum. 45 In response, Basel III also imposes capital
requirements on some shadow-banking activities. For example, it extends capital
requirements to certain commitments to provide credit (loss protection) or liquidity
(protection on the timing of payments, where ultimate losses are not expected). It also
imposes capital requirements on short-term off-balance sheet commitments. 46

2. Ring-Fencing. Another broad regulatory approach is ring-fencing, which can be
understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and
reduce risk. 47 The deconstruction can occur in various ways: by separating risky assets
from the firm; by preventing the firm itself from engaging in risky activities or investing
in risky assets; or by protecting the firm from affiliate and bankruptcy risks.

43

Basel III: A global regulatory framework, supra note 38, at para. 122.
Id. at para. 18-22.
45
See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text (discussing shadow banking).
46
Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Speech at the
Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute Conference, Nov. 22,
2013, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm. In the United
States, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes additional possible capital requirements. Section 171
of that Act, for example, requires regulators to establish minimum leverage and riskbased capital requirements for “banks, bank holding companies, and nonbank financial
firms identified by the [Financial Stability Oversight Council] for enhanced Fed
supervision.” James M. Pappenfus, Dodd-Frank and Basel III’s knowledge problem, 36
HOUSE J. INT’L L. 253, 262 (2014) (emphasis added). See also Regulatory Capital Rules:
Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios,
Capital Adequacy, Transition Provisions, and Prompt Corrective Action, 77 Fed. Reg.
52,791 (proposed Aug. 30, 2012) (to be codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R.).
47
Steven L. Schwarcz, Ring-Fencing, 87 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 69
(2013).
44
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Two forms of ring-fencing are commonly used for banks. One is to protect a bank
from being taken advantage of by its affiliated firms—essentially preserving the business
and assets of the ring-fenced bank. Regulation may require, for example, that transactions
between a bank and its affiliates be arm’s length. This is exemplified by Section 23A of
the U.S. Federal Reserve Act and by the recommendations of the report of the UK
Independent Commission on Banking (often called the “Vickers Report”). 48 The Vickers
Report recommends, for example, that interactions by UK retail banks with their affiliates
must be at arm’s length. 49

Ring-fencing is also commonly used to limit a bank’s risky activities and
investments. This use of ring-fencing had been the focus of the Glass-Steagall Act in the
United States, 50 and is currently exemplified by the Volcker Rule, 51 as well as by the UK
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act of 2013 and the Liikanen Report. 52 The
Volcker Rule, for example, limits proprietary trading by banks, which was thought to be

48

INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING, FINAL REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS (2011)
(often called the “Vickers Report” after Sir John Vickers, the Commission’s chair).
49
Id. at 12.
50
The Glass-Steagall Act ring-fenced deposit-taking banks by prohibiting them from
engaging in the securities business, which was perceived as risky. The Glass-Steagall
Act’s ring-fencing was repealed in November 12, 1999 by the passage of the GrammLeach-Bliley Act of 1999. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). Glass-Steagall refers to sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Banking
Act of 1933. Section 16 was codified as 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Section 20 was
codified as 12 U.S.C. §377. Section 21 was codified as 12 U.S.C. §378(a)(1). Section 32
was codified as 12 U.S.C. § 78. Repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999, (Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, enacted Nov. 12,
1999), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-106publ102/html/PLAW106publ102.htm.
51
This rule is named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker – often cited
as its principal designer. It is being codified pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 619 & 1851.
52
The “Liikanen Report” was promulgated by a European Commission-appointed panel
of experts, chaired by Bank of Finland governor Erkki Liikanen. Although the Liikanen
Report does not refer to ring-fencing directly, it recommends that banks separate certain
of their risky activities from deposit-taking. Final Report of the High-level Expert Group
on Reforming the Structure of the EU Banking Sector, chaired by Erkki Liikanen (Oct. 2,
2012).
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a cause contributing to the financial crisis. 53 As codified, proprietary trading is defined as
“engaging as a principal for the trading account of [a bank] in any transaction to purchase
or sell, or otherwise acquire or dispose of, any security, any derivative, any contract of
sale of a commodity for future delivery, any option on any such … [aforementioned]
financial instrument.” 54 This definition, however, has been criticized as itself raising
questions, and the Volcker Rule itself has been criticized as reducing the economic
efficiency of banks that profited from proprietary trading. 55

Another common use of ring-fencing is to protect a firm from becoming subject
to liabilities and other risks associated with bankruptcy—usually called making the firm
“bankruptcy remote.” 56 Although this use of ring-fencing is standard for securitization
and covered bond transactions, it is not typically used in banking. 57 The reason is path

53

Section 4 of the UK Banking Reform Act similarly prohibits retail banks from “dealing
in securities as a principal.” The United Kingdom is also considering imposing a ban on
proprietary trading by affiliates of UK retail banks—presumably to make it less likely
that such affiliates could fail, which might imperil the retail banks. See PARLIAMENTARY
COMMISSION ON BANKING STANDARDS, PROPRIETARY TRADING, 2012-13, H.C. 1034, at
15-19.
54
12 U.S.C. § 1851(h)(4).
55
See, e.g., Charles Whitehead, The Volcker Rule And Evolving Financial Markets, 1
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 40 (2011). Other criticisms include the argument that the Volcker
Rule is motivating proprietary traders to leave commercial banks for firms like hedge
funds and investment banks. See, e.g., Deutsche Bank Loses Option Trader Saiers to
Hedge Fund Alphabet Management, BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2010, 10:33 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-14/deutsche-bank-loses-option-trader-saiersto-hedge-fund-alphabet-management.html; Top JPMorgan Prop Trader Leaves To
Launch Hedge Fund, FORBES (Feb., 15, 2013, 12:48 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/halahtouryalai/2013/02/15/top-jpmorgan-prop-trader-leavesto-launch-hedge-fund/. These firms are poorer at absorbing losses than commercial
banks, which tend to have much larger equity cushions, thus shifting the risk of
proprietary trading to a frailer part of the financial system.
56
Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Structured Finance, ELSEVIER’S
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION 6 (2011).
57
Ring-fencing can also be used to help ensure that a firm is able to operate on a
standalone basis even if its affiliated firms fail, but this form of ring-fencing has limited
application to financial regulation. It is more commonly used by utility companies that
need to ensure the public’s uninterrupted access to an important public service. See RingFencing, supra note 47.
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dependent: at least in the United States, banks have not historically been subject to
bankruptcy law. 58

3. Monitoring Through Stress Testing. Another broader regulatory approach is
stress testing, which is effectively a form of monitoring. 59 Stress testing has long been
used in diverse fields, including engineering and medicine, to gauge the stability of
something through rigorous testing beyond normal operating conditions. In a banking
context, stress testing examines how banks would be likely to fare under hypothetical
negative economic conditions, including financial market crashes, high unemployment
and high default rates, failures of other large financial institutions, and liquidity
shortages. 60

Although some banks have earlier used stress testing in their internal risk
management, it has been required since 1996 by an amendment to Basel I. 61 Since the
financial crisis, regulators have expanded the use of stress testing. 62 In the United States,

58

See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (excluding deposit-taking banks and domestic insurance
companies from federal bankruptcy law).
59
See infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. This contrasts with the other regulation
discussed, which is intended to correct market failures.
60
Robert Weber, A Theory for Deliberation-Oriented Stress Testing Regulation, 98
MINN. L. REV. 2236, 2239 (2014).
61
MARIO QUAGLIARIELLO, STRESS-TESTING THE BANKING SYSTEM: METHODOLOGIES
AND APPLICATIONS 1 (2009); Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market
risks, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 42 (originally released Jan. 1996, last
updated Nov. 2005), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf.
62
Notably, this was sparked by the 2009 stress tests performed by the U.S. Federal
Reserve on nineteen of the country’s largest banks in an attempt to stave off future losses
and ensure that those banks could continue lending despite the deepening recession. See
Timothy Geithner, How We Tested the Big Banks, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A33,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/07/opinion/07geithner.html?_r=0
(explaining the motivation of the stress testing program was to “help replace uncertainty
with transparency” as well as outlining the stress testing process).
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for example, the Dodd-Frank Act requires stress testing not only for banks but also for
non-bank systematically important financial institutions. 63

Stress testing is a form of monitoring because it gauges the health of financial
institutions but does not directly offer a remedy should those institutions that fail the test.
In the event a bank fails a stress test, regulators must decide on the next steps. The
European Central Bank, for example, has been conducting stress tests on EU banks; a
bank that fails the test will have two weeks to submit its proposed corrective measures
and capital plans. 64

III. MACROPRUDENTIAL REGULATION

Macroprudential regulation refers to financial regulation of the financial system’s
ability to function as a network, within which firms and markets can operate. As
discussed, its primary goal is to prevent systemic risk. Ideal macroprudential regulation
would therefore act ex ante, limiting the triggers of systemic shocks.

A. Limiting the Triggers of Systemic Shocks.

1. Maturity Transformation. Several vulnerabilities of the financial system can
trigger systemic shocks. The classic vulnerability is maturity transformation: the assetliability mismatch that results from the short-term funding of long-term projects. This
mismatch creates a “liquidity default risk” that borrowers will be unable to repay their
lenders. According to some scholars, illiquidity is the fundamental source of financial
failure.
63

Weber, supra note 60, at 2292. Banks with more than $10 billion (previously the
threshold was $50 billion) in assets are now required to have two stress tests performed
annually, one done internally and one conducted by regulators.
64
Jeff Black & Sonia Sirletti, ECB Plans to Limit Stress-Test Inputs in Bank Checks,
BLOOMBERG (July 11, 2014, 11:09 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-07-11/ecb-plans-to-limit-stress-test-inputs-inbank-checks.html (describing the European Central Bank’s plan to conduct stress tests of
euro-area lenders).
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A bank “run” is the typical (though far from the only) example of maturity
transformation leading to a liquidity default. In a bank run, panicked depositors will
collectively demand their money. If, as is usual, the long-term maturities of the bank’s
assets cannot generate cash quickly enough to pay the current depositor demands, the
bank will default. And if (again, as is usual) the defaulting bank is interconnected with
other banks, the defaulting bank’s failure to pay its obligations to those other banks can,
in turn, deprive those other banks of money to pay their creditors—with the chain
spreading. Maturity transformation was also at the core of the financial crisis, such as the
well-known shadow-banking example, discussed below, of money-market mutual funds
that used short-term loans by investors, essentially withdrawable on demand, to fund
long-term projects.

In mid-September 2008, a money-market mutual fund in the United States “broke
the buck” for the first time in fourteen years. 65 This meant that the fund’s price per share,
or net asset value (“NAV”), fell below $1.00—the point at which fund investors will
begin losing money. Because shares in mutual funds were not then U.S. government
insured, 66 fund investors industrywide raced to try to withdraw their investments from
any remaining short-term assets—the effective equivalent of a bank run—before other
investors depleted those assets. 67 To mitigate potential systemic consequences, the U.S.
government stepped in to guarantee money-market mutual fund share prices, thereby
calming investors and quelling the run. 68

65

Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 16, 2008, 9:41 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a5O2y1go1GRU. See
supra note 4 and accompanying text for a discussion of money-market mutual funds. See
also infra note 79 and accompanying text for discussion of proposed regulatory solutions.
66
This contrasts with bank deposits, which are guaranteed up to specified limits by the
U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
67
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher M. Gandia, Money Market Funds Run Risk: Will
Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 313, 317 (2014)
(also noting that the money-market mutual funds were unable to secure short-term credit
to meet the sudden demand).
68
Id.
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Maturity transformation is thus a vulnerability of the financial system, but it is
also a benefit. Using short-term debt to fund long-term projects is attractive because, if
managed to avoid a default, it tends to lower the cost of borrowing. The interest rate on
short-term debt is usually lower than that on long-term debt because, other things being
equal, it is easier to assess a borrower’s ability to repay in the short term than in the long
term, and long-term debt carries greater interest-rate risk.

Regulation should not, therefore, attempt to prohibit maturity transformation per
se. In a banking context, for example, the standard regulatory solution is not to require
banks to match-fund their assets. Rather, governments often provide deposit insurance
that limits the likelihood that depositors will panic. 69

In other contexts, however, maturity transformation may well remain a real
vulnerability. Because many shadow-banking sources of funding, such as short-term
commercial paper, are not payable on demand—and thus are not subject to the same type
of “run” risk as traditional deposits—deposit insurance is not a solution. And other
regulatory solutions are likely to be imperfect. 70 Depending on how it is designed,
regulation protecting the financial system against maturity-transformation risk can
increase moral hazard, which in turn can motivate risky actions by shadow banks. For
example, regulation that protects the shadow-bank issuer of short-term securities against
its own risky actions would almost certainly increase moral hazard. Regulation that
limits incentives for shadow banks to engage in maturity transformation—such as
imposing higher capital requirements on firms that engage in maturity transformation—

69

See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
In the context of money-market mutual funds, for example, regulators have been
debating potential reforms for years. In July 2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) announced regulatory reforms to be implemented in two years, but
the regulation remains controversial. See Sarah N. Lynch, SEC’s long path to money
market fund reform ends in compromise, REUTERS (July 23, 2014, 5:16 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/23/us-sec-moneyfundsidUSKBN0FS08E20140723. See also supra notes 3, 6, & 65-68 and accompanying text
for a discussion of money-market mutual funds and shadow banking.
70
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would reduce moral hazard but would also reduce the economic efficiency achieved by
maturity transformation. 71

Thus, the liquidity default risk that inevitably remains can trigger systemic
shocks. Indeed, the failure of pre-financial-crisis regulation to adequately address
liquidity default risk resulting from shadow banking’s maturity transformation “is widely
believed to have contributed to the buildup of risks in the financial system in the period
leading up to” that crisis. 72

2. Limited Liability. Another vulnerability is the financial system’s failure to
require market participants to fully internalize their harm. As a result, they are
economically motivated to engage in risky but profitable transactions because much of
the harm from a possible systemic collapse would be externalized onto other market
participants as well as onto ordinary citizens impacted by an economic collapse.

The most direct regulatory solution should therefore be to require market
participants to internalize that harm. For various reasons, including the longstanding
limited liability accorded corporate shareholders throughout the world, that may not be
feasible. With the rise of shadow banking, limited liability is becoming especially
problematic. For the small and decentralized firms (such as hedge funds) that dominate
the shadow-banking sector, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability
gives these investor-managers strong incentives to take risks that could generate out-size
personal profits, even if that greatly increases systemic risk.

71

A possible compromise might be regulation that protects not individual shadow banks
but the overall markets for short-term securities, such as the Commercial Paper Funding
Facility put into place by the U.S. Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to protect
the commercial paper market. I later discuss this in Part III.C.2, infra.
72
Regulating Ex Post, supra note 7, at 85.
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3. Other Vulnerabilities. The very nature of the financial system also subjects it to
other systemic vulnerabilities that cannot be regulated away. 73 Because the financial
system exhibits the characteristics of—and effectively comprises—a high-risk system
that is susceptible to “normal accidents,” regulators cannot predict, and therefore cannot
eliminate, all the triggers of systemic shocks. Another reason why regulators cannot
realistically eliminate all of the triggers of systemic shocks is that certain of the market
failures that are the subject of imperfect microprudential regulation could even trigger
systemic failures. For example, information failure, rationality failure, agency failure, and
risk marginalization could, individually or in combination, cause one or more large
financial firms to overinvest, leading to bankruptcy; and the bankruptcy of a large,
interconnected financial firm could lead to a systemic collapse. It therefore is virtually
certain that the financial system will face systemic shocks from time to time.

B. Existing Macroprudential Regulatory Approaches.

Since the financial crisis, policymakers and regulators generally recognize the
need for macroprudential regulation. However, they tend to approach it as constituting a
loose assortment of “tools” in their “toolkit.” The macroprudential ‘toolkit’ generally
comprises cross-sectoral leverage ceilings, credit and credit-growth ceilings, reserve and
capital buffer requirements, liquidity minima and maturity mismatch maxima, dynamic
countercyclical provisioning, and surveillance and data collection. 74 It is still unclear,
though, which “tools” should be used in which circumstances, or as to how the tools
should be calibrated. That itself creates risk because the misapplication of these tools—
such as imposing excessively restrictive leverage or credit and credit-growth ceilings—
may be as likely to cause financial problems as to solve them.

73

Cf. supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (observing that marginalization of risk
can also have macroprudential consequences, and that regulatory solutions are all second
best).
74
Robert Hockett, “Implementing Macroprudential Finance-Oversight Policy: Legal
Considerations” 12-13 (Jan. 20, 2013 draft prepared for the International Monetary Fund;
on file with author).
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For example, because economic growth is strongly tied to the availability of
credit, 75 overly restrictive credit or credit-growth ceilings could cause the economy to
contract. Yet the very justification for these ceilings—the “compelling evidence that
credit booms tend to precede particularly severe and prolonged downturns” 76—is
questionable. Evidence of the mere tendency for credit booms to precede severe
economic downturns does not prove a causal relationship. And even if that causal
relationship were proved, the evidence does not yet appear to provide a clear basis for
quantifying a limitation on credit growth.

The misapplication of capital requirements could also backfire. The regulatory
reform dialogue increasingly is focusing on a countercyclical and flexible approach to
capital requirements. 77 Finance, and especially banking, is by nature procyclical: the
increased availability of capital stimulates economic growth. 78 Historically, financial
regulation has tended to be procyclical as well—loosening during booms and becoming
stricter after crises. 79 The rationale for countercyclical capital requirements is that they

75

See, e.g., GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS,
CREDIT BUBBLES, AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET 121 (2008).
76
Elliott, Feldberg, & Lehnert, supra note 24, at 2 (observing this justification for the
“growing support for the view that policymakers should use a variety of tools to
minimize . . . excessive credit growth” that could fuel asset bubbles). They also observe,
id., that some economists even conclude from this evidence that the “primary purpose” of
macroprudential tools should be “controlling credit growth.”
77
See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to
Regulating Financial Markets, 2013 University of ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW 881, 916 (2013)
(discussing flexible capital requirements as a macroprudential tool); Richard Berner,
Director of Office of Financial Research, Remarks at the Joint Conference of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland and Office of Financial Research, Financial Stability
Analysis: “Using the Tools, Finding the Data” (May 30, 2013) (identifying
countercyclical capital requirements as a tool to reduce or neutralize “threats to financial
stability”).
78
Haocong Ren, Countercyclical Financial Regulation 3 (The World Bank, Working
Paper No. 5823, 2011), available at http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/18139450-5823 (also observing that during economic booms and bubbles, credit expansion
outpaces economic growth; and that during economic downturns, lending contracts,
further worsening economic prospects).
79
Brett H. McDonnell, Designing Countercyclical Capital Buffers, 18 N.C. BANKING
INST. 123 (2013) (noting that the same factors that cause cycles in the financial markets,
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would help to moderate economic growth, discouraging the buildup of imbalances during
economic booms and bubbles (by reducing excessive risk-taking and credit expansion). 80

But countercyclical capital requirements are only as good as the accuracy of the
indicators that determine their application and timing. Potential indicators include GDP
growth, credit conditions, asset prices, banking performance and soundness indicators,
leverage ratios, and credit and liquidity spreads. 81 There has been debate, however, about
whether countercyclical regulation is actually feasible given that it is virtually impossible
to know ex ante whether a financial cycle is rational or merely a bubble. 82 Furthermore,
countercyclical regulation’s effectiveness could be undermined by regulatory arbitrage if
the measures are not analogously applied to relevant shadow banking activities. 83

Accuracy is critical because the misapplication or mistiming of countercyclical
regulation can have unintended adverse consequences, as illustrated by the notorious
savings and loan (“S&L”) crisis of the 1980s in the United States. S&L institutions faced
a period in which rising interest rates made lending less attractive to borrowers. 84 To
avoid having to commit government funds to bail out financially stressed institutions,
regulators relieved the stress by engaging in a type of countercyclicality: they eased the
capital ratios in order to “help banks muddle through [that] difficult period.” 85 However,
the result of that forbearance, in conjunction with other regulatory-relief steps, was to
rapidly expand the size of the S&L industry—from $686 billion in 1982 to $1.1 trillion

cause financial regulations to reinforce the cycles). See also id. (discussing how capital
requirements are procyclical when they force banks to cut back on lending due to
faltering capital positions because of decreasing credit quality and increasing losses,
further deteriorating economic performance and resulting in even more credit losses).
80
Ren, supra note 78, at 4-5.
81
Ren, supra note 78, at 6.
82
Professor Patricia A. McCoy, Lecture on Countercyclical Regulation and its
Challenges at the Centre for Commercial Law Studies (June 26, 2013) (arguing that even
for real estate bubbles, no one has adequate information ex ante to know for sure whether
the price increases are rationale or merely a bubble).
83
Ren, supra note 78, at 8.
84
Elliott, Feldberg, & Lehnert, supra note 24, at 34.
85
Id. (observing that this countercyclicality was imprecisely implemented).
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1985. 86 When the S&L industry eventually collapsed, its increased size led to the largest
federal bailout in U.S. history up to that time. 87

C. Alternative Macroprudential Regulatory Approaches.

It therefore is clear that, notwithstanding the best efforts of regulators, the
financial system will inevitably face systemic shocks. Accordingly, macroprudential
regulation should also work ex post—after a systemic shock is triggered—to break the
transmission of the shock and limit its impact. This approach accords with chaos theory,
which addresses the problem of inevitable systemic shocks in complex engineering
systems. The most successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of
failures are limited.

1. Breaking the Transmission of Systemic Shocks. In examining how
macroprudential regulation could break the transmission of systemic shocks and limit
their impact, consider three factors that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
international Financial Stability Board (FSB) have identified as determinants of systemic
risk: interconnectedness, size, and substitutability. In reality, these factors relate not to
vulnerability but to the transmission of systemic shocks and their impact. These factors
implicitly assume that the financial system is subject to vulnerabilities that could trigger
systemic shocks.

To break the transmission of systemic failures in the financial system would
require that the transmission mechanisms all be identifiable. It is probably not feasible,
however, to identify all those mechanisms in advance. Ring-fencing can be useful as a
86

Id. The eased capital ratios enabled rapid growth. For example, a $2 million dollar
investment in a new S&L could be leveraged into $1.3 billion in assets. See 1 DIV. OF
RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE 80’S–LESSONS
FOR THE FUTURE, 172-3 (1997), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/index.html.
87
See Lawrence A. Cunningham & David Zaring, Three or Four Approaches to
Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78
GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW 39, 51 (2009).
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crude barrier, however. 88 This is the primary regulatory approach taken in the United
Kingdom, for example, to protect so-called retail banking, such as basic lending and
deposit taking. 89

2. Stabilizing Systemically Important Firms and Markets. Because regulation
cannot completely break the transmission of systemic shocks, regulators must also focus
on trying to stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets impacted by the
shocks. There are at least two ways that regulation could accomplish that: by requiring
those firms and markets to be more internally robust, and/or by providing appropriate
liquidity to those firms and markets.

Regulation could help to stabilize systemically important firms and markets by
requiring them to be more internally robust. Financial regulation has long focused on
requiring traditional deposit-taking banks to be robust, usually through capital and
solvency requirements. Since the financial crisis, the United States, the European Union,
and other jurisdictions are beginning to also subject “systemically important” non-bank
financial firms (“SIFI”s) to a range of capital, solvency, and similar requirements.

This approach is imperfect, however, because it mixes the goals of
macroprudential and microprudential regulation. The microprudential goal is to assure
that individual firms can continue operating. By subjecting banks and SIFIs to rigorous
capital, solvency, and similar requirements (to assure that they can continue operating),
that microprudential goal inadvertently becomes a goal of the macroprudential regulation.
The flaw in this mixed approach is that macroprudential regulation’s only goal should be
to protect the financial system’s overall capacity to function as a network.
Macroprudential regulation need not, therefore, impose capital or solvency requirements
on individual firms—even those that are systemically important—so long as it otherwise

88
89

See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (discussing ring-fencing).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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achieves that goal. This regulatory flexibility is important because capital and solvency
requirements do not always efficiently reduce systemic risk. 90

Other potential approaches to make systemically important firms more internally
robust include requiring at least some portion of the firm’s debt to be in the form of socalled contingent capital. Contingent capital debt would automatically convert to equity
upon the occurrence of pre-agreed events.

As a parallel to stabilizing systemically important firms by requiring them to be
more internally robust, regulation could help to stabilize systemically important financial
markets by requiring them also to be more internally robust. For example, increased
speed in data transmission is generally associated with market efficiency, but the extreme
speeds at which algorithmic trading takes place creates a danger of market collapse. In
response, securities market regulators have been proposing the adoption of circuitbreaker rules to at least temporarily halt trading under specified circumstances.

Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms and markets
by providing appropriate liquidity. Liquidity has traditionally been used, especially by
government central banks acting as lenders of last resort, to help prevent financial firms
from defaulting. Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms could follow
this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least be partly privatized by
taxing those firms to create a systemic risk fund.

90

Regulating Financial Change, supra note 1. Cf. Katharina Pistor, “On the Theoretical
Foundations for Regulating Financial Markets” 46 (June 2012 draft, available at
http://works.bepress.com/katharina_pistor/11) (observing that “imposing capital or
reserve requirements can push market participants to find ways [including the use of
derivatives] to formally comply while making sure that their disposable assets are in fact
not much curtailed,” thereby creating “additional sources of liquidity risk [that can]
remain[] largely unrecognized by financial intermediaries and regulators alike”). This
chapter does not address derivatives per se, because they will be addressed elsewhere in
the Handbook. For a brief introduction to derivatives and financial regulation, see Steven
L. Schwarcz, Derivatives and Collateral: Balancing Remedies and Systemic Risk,
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW symposium issue (forthcoming 2014-15), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2419460.
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Privatizing the source of liquidity would likewise help to internalize externalities,
thereby not only offsetting the cost to taxpayers of liquidity advances that are not repaid
but also, if structured appropriately, reducing moral hazard by discouraging fund
contributors—including those that believe they are “too big to fail”—from engaging in
financially risky activities. 91

Because financial markets can also be triggers and transmitters of systemic
shocks, liquidity should be used to stabilize systemically important financial markets. For
example, in response to the post-Lehman collapse of the commercial paper market, the
U.S. Federal Reserve created the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (“CPFF”) to act as
a lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing “temporary liquidity
distortions” by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not
otherwise sell their paper. The CPFF helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.

IV. CONCLUSION

Banking and financial regulation is needed to protect the financial system, which
provides functions that are essential to economic development. Traditionally, financial
regulation focused on banking because banks historically have aggregated moneys
(primarily by taking deposits from customers) and then allocated those monies (by
making loans to borrowers). Traditional financial regulation is geared to ensuring that
deposit-taking banks can continue to perform these functions efficiently. In recent years,
however, shadow banking has begun to overtake traditional banking. Financial regulation
must therefore also address shadow banking.

Regardless of whether it addresses traditional or shadow banking, financial
regulation has two overall goals: to ensure that the components of the financial system—

91

For a thoughtful perspective on banks getting too big to manage, see Lawrence G.
Baxter, Betting Big: Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Ultra
Large Banking, 31 REV. BANK’G & FIN. L. 765, 879 (2012).
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firms and markets—can efficiently perform their underlying economic functions, and to
ensure the financial system’s ability to itself function as a network within which those
components can operate. Regarding the first goal, firms and markets generally operate
efficiently absent market failures. Financial regulation thus should help to correct those
market failures—which include information and rationality failure, which can undermine
the reliability of pricing, and agency failure in which conflicts can distort
decisionmaking.

The other goal of financial regulation is to protect against the risk—usually called
systemic risk—that the financial system will fail to function as a network within which
firms and markets can operate. Although this regulation ideally would prevent systemic
risk, several vulnerabilities of the financial system (such as maturity transformation and
limited corporate liability) can trigger systemic shocks. It therefore is virtually certain,
notwithstanding the best efforts of regulators, that the financial system will face systemic
shocks from time to time. Accordingly, financial regulation should also be designed to
work after systemic shocks are triggered, by breaking the transmission of the shocks and
limiting their impact.
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